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The transition to competitive wholesale and retail markets for electricity in the U.S. has 
been a difficult and contentious process.  This paper examines the progress that has been 
made in the evolution of wholesale and retail electricity market institutions.  Various 
indicia of the performance of these market institutions are presented and discussed.  
Significant progress has been made on the wholesale competition front but major 
challenges must still be confronted.  The framework for supporting retail competition has 
been less successful, especially for small customers. Empirical evidence suggests that 
well-designed competitive market reforms have led to performance improvements in a 
number of dimensions and have benefited customers through lower retail prices. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Despite longstanding academic interest (Joskow and Schmalensee (1983)) and 
some previous experience in other countries, comprehensive electricity sector 
restructuring and competition initiatives only began to be taken seriously by U.S. 
policymakers in the mid-1990s.2 The first U.S. retail competition and restructuring 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for research support from the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research 
and from the Cambridge-MIT Institute (CMI).  Research performed by Matthew Styczynski and David 
Ovadia contributed to this paper. 
 
2 Of course, wholesale power markets in which proximate vertically integrated utilities traded power on a 
daily and hourly basis subject to very limited regulation, have existed in the U.S. for many years.  In 
addition, during the 1980s the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978 stimulated the 
development of a non-utility power sector selling electricity produced primarily from cogeneration 
facilities and renewable energy facilities to local utilities under long-term contracts (Joskow, 1989).  The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 also removed important barriers to the broader development of unregulated non-
utility generating facilities and expanded the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authority 
to order utilities to provide transmission service to support wholesale power transactions. However, these 
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programs began in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and California in early 1998 and spread 
to about a dozen additional states by the end of 2000.  By that time several additional 
states had announced plans to introduce similar programs in the near future and a 
competitive market model for the electricity industry seemed to be sweeping the United 
States.  The primary political selling point for competition in those states that were early 
adopters was that it would benefit consumers by leading to lower costs and lower prices 
in both the short run and the long run.  The ideological commitment to competition as an 
alternative to regulated monopoly that characterized the Thatcher government’s 
electricity sector privatization, restructuring and competition program in the United 
Kingdom (UK) was not a powerful force driving these reforms in the U.S.  Indeed, the 
vast majority of the states that have implemented comprehensive wholesale and retail 
electricity competition initiatives cast their electoral votes for Al Gore in 2000 and John 
Kerry in 2004 and neither President Bush nor many of the states that gave him his 
greatest support have been strong supporters of comprehensive electricity sector 
restructuring and competitive market initiatives.3 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) supported the development 
of competitive wholesale markets during both the Clinton and Bush administrations. In 
1996 FERC adopted rules specifying new requirements for transmission-owning utilities 
to make available open access transmission service tariffs (Order 888) and provide 
information about the availability and price of transmission service on their networks 
(Order 889).  In late 1999 FERC embraced a more aggressive restructuring and wholesale 
                                                                                                                                                 
developments largely reflected modest expansions of competition at the wholesale level built upon a basic 
model of regulated vertically integrated franchised monopolies. 
 
3 When President Bush was governor Bush he did support a comprehensive restructuring and competition 
program in Texas.  
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market institutional change agenda in its Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) rule 
(Order 2000).  It used various carrots and sticks to induce utilities and state regulators to 
adopt an aggressive restructuring and competition agenda.   
However, the California electricity crisis of 2000-2001 (Joskow (2001)), concerns 
about market power problems there and elsewhere, phantom trading and fraudulent price 
reporting and accounting revelations, Enron’s bankruptcy, and the financial collapse of 
many merchant generating and trading companies subsequently took the glow off of 
“deregulation.”  Rising wholesale market prices, resulting from rising natural gas and 
coal prices, closed or reversed the gap between the generation cost component of bundled 
regulated retail prices and the prices for equivalent generation services purchased in 
competitive wholesale power markets. This further reduced the interest of consumers and 
politicians in market-based prices, especially in those states with relatively low regulated 
prices.  The slow pace at which retail customers switched to competitive suppliers in 
those states that adopted retail competition programs was disappointing and in turn led to 
a declining number of competitive retail supply options for residential and small 
commercial customers in many of those states.   
 Since the year 2000 no additional states have announced plans to introduce 
competitive reforms and several states that had planned to implement reforms have 
delayed, cancelled or significantly scaled back their electricity competition programs.  
Moreover, FERC‘s efforts to promote a competitive wholesale restructuring and 
competition model with a small number of RTOs covering large regions of the country 
and meeting stringent criteria for market design, geographic scope and independence  
confronted increasing political opposition after 2000.  FERC found itself at war with 
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many states in the Southeast and the West as they resisted its efforts to expand wholesale 
market and transmission institutions that it had identified as being necessary to support 
efficient competitive wholesale markets in all regions of the country.   FERC’s proposed 
Standard Market Design (SMD) rule issued in 2002 created enormous controversy and 
was withdrawn entirely in July 2005.  The pressure from FERC to implement fully and 
effectively the creation of RTOs pursuant to Order 2000 appears to have receded as well. 
Re-integration of generation with transmission and distribution has begun to occur in a 
few states. Even the Cato Institute has lost patience with competitive reforms in 
electricity and appears to see merit in returning to the good old days of regulated 
vertically integrated utilities (Van Doren and Taylor (2004)).   At the same time, most of 
the states in the Northeast, a few in the Midwest, and Texas, appear to be committed to 
moving forward with the development of competitive wholesale and retail markets and to 
making them work well, though the strength of the policy commitment to competitive 
electricity markets may have declined in these venues as well.   
 After nearly 25 years of federal and state restructuring, regulatory reform and 
deregulation initiatives affecting almost every U.S. industry that had been subject to price 
and entry regulation prior to 1980, the deregulation policy ship appears to have run 
aground as it tries to lead the U.S. electric power industry along a path to competition.  
What is the problem?  Are things as bad as opponents of competition suggest?  Or does it 
depend on whether one looks at the glass being half empty or half full?  What needs to be 
done to fix the problems that are really there to make a competitive model more 
attractive? 
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 One of the challenges associated with providing objective answers to these 
questions for the U.S. is the lack of any comprehensive assessments of the effects of 
these reforms on costs, prices, innovation, and consumer welfare of the type that has been 
done, for example, for the UK (e.g. Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Domah and Pollitt 
(2001)). This kind of counterfactual analysis is difficult to do well under any 
circumstances.  It is especially challenging when the data available to compare 
performance under regulated and competitive regimes is extremely limited, as is the case 
in the U.S.  In this paper, I offer an array of “fragments of evidence” to illuminate what 
we know and what we don’t know about the effects of competitive reforms on various 
performance indicia for the electricity industry in the United States to date.  I examine the 
evolution and effects of both wholesale and retail competition reforms.  I view this as an 
interim assessment because the restructuring and competition program for the electricity 
sector in the U.S. is clearly incomplete and a work in progress.   
 
2. EVOLUTION OF NEW WHOLESALE MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
 The foundation of any well-functioning competitive electricity market system 
(with or without retail competition for all end-use customers) is a well-functioning 
wholesale market and supporting transmission network operating and investment 
institutions.  Wholesale electricity markets do not design themselves but must be 
designed as a central component of any successful electricity restructuring and 
competition program.  The U.S. electricity sector’s legacy industry structure built upon a 
large number of regulated vertically integrated monopolies and nearly 150 network 
control areas was not conducive to creating well functioning competitive wholesale and 
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retail electricity markets (Joskow and Schmalensee (1983), Joskow (2000, 2005a)).  
However, unlike England and Wales, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, 
Argentina and other countries, the U.S. did not proceed with its wholesale and retail 
competition initiatives with a clear coherent blueprint for vertical and horizontal 
restructuring, wholesale market design, transmission institutions, or retail competition.  
There has been no federal legislation endorsing a comprehensive national electricity 
restructuring and competition policy.  Horizontal and vertical restructuring has been 
much more limited than would have been ideal to support a smooth transition to 
competitive wholesale and retail markets. Rather than relying on a clear and coherent 
national reform policy with supporting federal legislation, as was the case for the earlier 
reforms of the airlines, trucking, railroads, and telecommunications, electricity sector 
reforms have depended on regulatory initiatives taken by FERC under statutes that are 60 
years old and by diverse and often inconsistent policies adopted by individual states. 
2.1  FERC Takes the Lead   
FERC has undertaken a number of initiatives to support the creation of 
competitive wholesale markets that are consistent with the diverse restructuring and 
competition policies that have been adopted by different states and associated political 
constraints on FERC’s authority. Orders 888 and 889 issued in 1996 (and subsequently 
amended a number of times) required transmission owners to provide access to their 
networks at cost-based prices, to end discriminatory practices against unaffiliated 
generators and marketers, to expand their transmission networks if they did not have the 
capacity to accommodate requests for transmission service, and to provide non-
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discriminatory access to information required by third parties to make effective use of 
their networks.  
FERC Order 2000 issued in December 1999 contained a new set of regulations 
designed to facilitate the “voluntary” creation of large Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTO) to resolve what FERC perceived as problems created by the 
balkanized control of U.S. transmission networks and alleged discriminatory practices 
affecting independent generators and energy traders seeking to use the transmission 
networks of vertically integrated firms under Order 888 rules.4  Order 2000 also 
articulates several important goals for wholesale market institutions and represents a very 
significant step forward in the framework supporting the development of competitive 
wholesale electricity markets. These include (a) the creation of independent transmission 
system operators who will operate the transmission network reliably and economically 
without being influenced by the financial interests of generators, wholesale and retail 
markets of power; (b) the creation of large regional transmission networks with common 
transmission access and pricing rules and common wholesale market institutions to 
mitigate inefficiencies associated with the balkanized ownership and operation of 
transmission networks in the U.S.; (c) the creation of a set basic wholesale market 
institutions to support buying and selling power economically and for allocating scarce 
transmission capacity efficiently. 
 In mid-2002 FERC commenced a new rulemaking proceeding to consider a 
proposal for a “Standard Market Design” or “SMD” that would apply to all transmission-
                                                 
4 Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999).  Order 2000 technically makes 
participation in an RTO voluntary, but there are carrots and sticks available to FERC that will create 
significant pressure for utilities to join RTOs.  Order 2000 does not mandate a particular organizational 
form for an RTO, however. 
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owning utilities over which FERC had jurisdiction. The proposed SMD rule enumerated 
a much more detailed set of wholesale market design requirements : (a) an Independent 
Transmission Provided (ITP) would be required to assume operating responsibility of all 
transmission systems, no matter how small; (b) a locational marginal pricing (LMP) 
based organized day-ahead and real time wholesale market design and congestion 
management system similar to those that were already in place in PJM and New York; (c) 
resource adequacy requirements that would obligate all load serving entities (LSEs) to 
make forward commitments for generating capacity and/or demand response to meet 
their forecast peak demand plus a reserve margin to be determined through a regional 
stakeholder process; (d) a regional transmission planning and expansion process would 
be implemented to identify transmission investment needs for interconnection, to meet 
reliability requirements, and that are economically justified but which are not being 
provided by the market; and (e) strong market monitoring and market power mitigation 
mechanisms would be required, including a $1000/Mwh bid cap for energy and ancillary 
services in the day-ahead and real time markets was proposed, as well as bidding 
restrictions to deal with local market power problems. 
2.2  Progress in the Development of Wholesale Market Institutions 
 Despite all of the political controversy surrounding these wholesale market reform 
initiatives, delays in implementing Order 2000 and the withdrawal of the proposed SMD 
rule in July 2005, a lot of progress has been made since 1996.  As a direct result of 
FERC’s “open access”  Orders 888 and 889, all transmission-owning utilities in the U.S. 
(either directly or through an independent system operator or ISO) now have made 
available reasonably standardized cost-based transmission service tariffs to support the 
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provision of transmission service on their networks to third parties; provide easily 
available real time information to third parties about the availability and prices of 
transmission service on their networks; are required to interconnect independent power 
producers to their networks, must make their best efforts to expand their transmission 
networks to meet transmission service requests when adequate capacity is not available to 
accommodate these requests, must provide certain network support services, including 
balancing services, to third parties using their networks; and are required to adhere to 
functional separation rules between the operators of their transmission networks and 
those who generate and market electricity using that network to mitigate abusive self-
dealing behavior.   These developments were essential to support entry of independent 
generators, expansions in wholesale trade, and retail competition as discussed further 
below. 
 FERC’s RTO rule has also led to important changes in the industry.  Table 1 and 
Figure 1 indicate that as of mid-2005, over 50% of the generating capacity in the U.S. is 
now operating within an ISO/RTO context (including Texas which is not subject to 
FERC jurisdiction) and other areas of the country are moving forward slowly with some 
type of ISO/RTO model. Moreover, most of these ISO/RTOs either have adopted the 
basic wholesale market principles reflected in the FERC SMD or (in the case of 
California) are in the process of adopting these institutions or (in the case of Texas) 
giving them serious consideration (FERC (2005), p.52).  I will discuss the attributes of 
the existing SMD markets in the Northeast presently. 
 While FERC could not and did not order vertically integrated utilities to divest 
either their generating facilities or their transmission facilities to separate regulated from 
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competitive lines of business, the combination of state initiatives and market 
opportunities has led to a considerable amount of restructuring of the ownership of 
existing generating plants.  In 1996 there was about 750,000 Mw of utility-owned electric 
generating capacity in the U.S. of which investor-owned utilities (IOUs) accounted for 
about 580,000 Mw.  After 1996, about 100,000 Mw of generating capacity was divested 
by IOUs and another 100,000 Mw transferred to unregulated utility affiliates to compete 
in the wholesale market.  Moreover, between 1999 and 2004 about 200,000 Mw of new 
generating capacity was completed, about 80% of which was accounted for by 
unregulated generating companies (independent power companies and unregulated 
affiliates of utilities).  See Table 2.  More new generating capacity entered the market 
between 2001 and 2003 than in any three year period in U.S. history (FERC (2005), p. 
59).  Indeed, there was so much entry (and so little exit) that by 2003 there was excess 
generating capacity in most regions of the country.  By 2004 over 40% of the power 
produced by investor-owned companies in the U.S. (i.e. excluding federal, state, 
municipal and cooperative generation) came from unregulated power plants, up from 
about 15% in 1996.  After a decline in market liquidity following Enron’s collapse, 
during 2004, trading in financial electricity products increased by a factor of ten (FERC 
(2005), p. 63). 
 The wholesale market design architecture articulated by FERC in its proposed 
SMD rule is also spreading, despite all of the controversy surrounding it and FERC’s 
withdrawal of its proposed mandatory SMD rule.  The primary features of this wholesale 
market design, built around a bid-based security constrained dispatch framework with 
locational or “nodal” pricing (LMP), has been or is being adopted in most of the regions 
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that have created ISOs to operate regional transmission networks (SPP and Texas are the 
notable exceptions, although a nodal pricing system is being considered in Texas; FERC 
(2005), p. 52; Megawatt Daily, August 19, 2005, page 7).  The SMD markets effectively 
integrate day-ahead, hour-ahead and real time energy prices, determined through a 
uniform price multi-unit auction framework, with the allocation of scarce transmission 
capacity.  This makes the price of congestion quite transparent since it is reflected in the 
differences in locational spot energy prices in a way that reflects that physical attributes 
of the transmission network.  Administrative rationing of scarce transmission capacity 
through the use of Transmission Line Relief (TLR) orders is, in principle, unnecessary, 
since scarce transmission capacity is rationed by prices and willingness to pay rather than 
through inefficient pro-rata administrative curtailments.  Spot prices for energy reflect the 
marginal cost of congestion at each location on the network, and in New England and 
New York they reflect the marginal cost losses as well. Locational prices adjust smoothly 
to changes in supply and demand conditions on the network consistent with changes in 
the network’s physical constraints. The creation and auctioning of Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTRs) that reflect the feasible set of allocations of generation to 
meet demand consistent with network transmission and related reliability constraints 
provides opportunities for market participants to hedge variations in congestion costs 
(Hogan (1992), Joskow and Tirole (2000)) and provide the equivalent of firm 
transmission service. 
2.3  Attributes of SMD Markets Operating in the Northeast 
 The operation of the SMD markets can be illustrated with some examples from 
New England and New York.  In New England the flow of power is typically from North 
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to South, with import constraints into Boston and Southeastern Connecticut under certain 
supply and demand conditions and export constraints from Maine and Rhode Island to 
the rest of New England. There are typically significant imports from Canada5 and more 
limited imports and exports from and to New York. The associated transmission 
interconnection facilities are often congested as well. The introduction of an LMP-based 
wholesale market system has made this congestion transparent, yields associated price 
signals and facilitates the efficient allocation of scarce transmission capacity.  In 2004, 
the average day-ahead LMP at the border between New Brunswick and Maine was about 
$53/Mwh and the average LMP in Connecticut was about $62/Mwh.  The price 
difference reflects network congestion and thermal losses.  The 17% difference in prices 
may not seem like much and perhaps not worth the effort.  However, the annual average 
locational prices hide significant variations over time and across generation nodes as 
supply and demand conditions change.  For example, Table 3 displays the average prices 
aggregated for each New England load zone for hour 17 on July 19, 2005, a hot day when 
the peak demand in New England hit a new record.  It is evident that the price in Boston 
(NE Massachusetts) is two and a half times the price in Maine, reflecting import 
congestion into the Boston area.  The zonal prices are much higher in Boston than in 
Connecticut at this hour even though on average during the year, Connecticut tends to be 
more congested than Boston. This shows that variations in spot prices for power reflect 
the fact that congestion patterns can change from one hour to another.   
The price differences in New York State between New York City and Upstate 
New York are much larger than those observed for New England. In 2004 energy prices 
in New York City average nearly $90/Mwh while the average energy price in upstate 
                                                 
5 Imports from outside the U.S. account for a very small fraction of aggregate U.S. electricity supplies. 
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New York was about $50, reflecting the import constraints into New York City and the 
high costs of the generating units located in the City (New York ISO (2005), p. 8). 
2.4  Market Power and Its Mitigation 
The development of competitive wholesale markets in the U.S. has been heavily 
influenced by concerns about market power.  The potential for market power to be a 
particularly severe potential problem in electricity markets was recognized many years 
ago (Joskow and Schmalensee (1983), Chapter 12).  It arises as a consequence of 
transmission constraints that limit the geographic expanse of competition, generation 
ownership concentration within constrained import areas, the non-storability of 
electricity, and the very low elasticity of demand for electricity (Joskow (1997), 
Borenstein (2002)).  Generator market power was a serious problem for several years 
following the launch of the privatization, restructuring and competition program in the 
UK (Wolfram (1999)).  Concerns about market power in the U.S. were reinforced by the 
events in California in 2000-2001 (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), Joskow and 
Kahn (2002)) where market power and the exploitation of market design imperfections 
contributed to the explosion in wholesale prices beginning in June 2000.   
Market power monitoring and mitigation has been a central focus of FERC’s 
wholesale market policies.  However, despite all of the concerns about market power, the 
wholesale markets in the Northeast appear to be very competitive based on a variety of 
structural, behavioral and performance indicia (New York ISO (2005), pp. iii, vii; ISO 
New England (2005), pp. 98-106; PJM (2005), pp. 48-67).  The primary exceptions 
emerge when supply and demand conditions lead to transmission constraints that create 
small “load pockets” within which the supply of generation is highly concentrated.  
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However, market monitoring and mitigation protocols appear to have been reasonably 
successful in mitigating the ability of suppliers to exercise significant market power in 
these situations as well.  Indeed, these measures may have been too successful, 
constraining prices from rising to competitive levels when demand is high, capacity is 
fully utilized, and competitive market prices should reflect scarcity values that exceed the 
price caps in place in the SMS markets (Joskow and Tirole (2005a)), a subject to which I 
shall return presently. 
2.5  Intertemporal and Locational Price Convergence 
Electricity is non-storable and supply and demand must be balanced with the 
ultimate in just in time production.  This leads to significant volatility in spot market 
prices.   However, the ability of suppliers and consumers to respond to large changes in 
real time prices is limited.  This is especially true for suppliers or consumers in 
neighboring control/market areas.  Many economic decisions in electricity markets are 
based on forward price signals in the hour-ahead, day-ahead, and longer forward markets.  
Market power is also more difficult to exercise in forward markets, making it attractive to 
move more price commitments into forward markets.  Price convergence (intertemporal 
trading profits are arbitraged away) between the day-ahead, hour-ahead and real time 
markets is an important indicator of market performance.  Price convergence in the SMD 
markets is reasonably good and has improved over time as these markets have been 
refined.  Well designed virtual bidding opportunities can and have helped to improve 
price convergence and improve market efficiency (New York ISO (2005), pp. 10-16; 
ISO-New England (2005), p. 49)    
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Because the ISOs in the Northeast have adopted similar market designs, the 
integration of these markets has been facilitated and barriers to trade between these 
markets continue to decline, though “seams” issues continue to be an area where more 
work is needed (New York ISO (2005), pp. 66-73).  The data in Figure 2 have been 
assembled to provide a simple picture of the interaction between these regional market 
areas as supply and demand conditions change.  Figure 2 displays the day-ahead peak 
period (16 day-time hours on weekdays) prices for power at the Massachusetts hub, New 
York City (NY-J), the New York Hudson Valley (NY-G), the PJM West hub, and the 
Cinergy hub in the Midwest, for several days during the first six months of 2004.  These 
hubs are all interconnected and power can be traded between them.  If there were no 
congestion, no losses, efficient transmission pricing, and no institutional barriers to trade 
across these areas the prices would be equal to one another. In other words the Law of 
One Price would prevail.  The general patterns of power flows in the Northeast are from 
the Midwest toward the East and from the North (Quebec, New Brunswick and Maine) to 
the South.  New York City and Long Island are more frequently import constrained by 
transmission and related reliability constraints than other areas in the Northeast.  It should 
be clear from Figure 2 that the Law of One Price does not prevail in Eastern electricity 
markets. 
The data in Figure 2 should be read starting at the far left with the locational day-
ahead prices for mid-January 2004.  It was extremely cold in the Northeast at this time, 
with temperatures falling to their lowest levels in over 50 years.  As a result, demand for 
both natural gas and electricity were unusually high for this time of year. The electricity 
market in New England in particular was severely stressed despite the fact that peak 
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demand was significantly lower than the quantity of installed capacity.  Many generating 
plants were out of service due to routine maintenance, weather related problems, and the 
allocation of gas supplies between electricity generation and other uses (New England 
ISO (2004), FERC (2005), pp. 13-23).  The demand for imported electricity into the 
Northeast from the Midwest increased and transmission capacity from the Midwest to the 
East became congested.  We can see this in the separation of prices at various locations in 
mid-January.  There was plenty of less costly generation in western Pennsylvania and the 
Midwest that could have served demand further east, but the transmission capacity to 
move the power east became constrained.  Moving to the right in Figure 2 we see that as 
the weather returned to more normal levels as the year progressed the differences in 
locational prices compress significantly.  New York City always has the highest prices 
because imports into New York City are frequently constrained by transmission 
limitations and some unique reliability considerations.  The Mass Hub and Hudson 
Valley prices are about the same and often close to the PJM West prices.  The Cinergy 
hub prices are always the lowest.  Then as we move into June 2004 on the far right of 
Figure 2 we see the prices separate again as hot weather moves into the Northeast and 
demand for imported electricity rises again. 
The markets in the Northeast and Midwest are clearly closely linked together, 
though spot energy prices exhibit locational differences as a result of congestion, losses, 
transmission service prices that exceed the marginal cost of providing transmission 
service (Joskow 2005b), and inefficiencies in the way these organized markets are linked 
together.  Additional investment in transmission capacity, more effective utilization of 
the transmission capacity in place, more efficient pricing for transmission service, and 
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enhanced integration and harmonization of the markets in New England, New York, PJM 
and MISO can reduce these price gaps and increase efficiency. 
2.5.  Wholesale Prices and Other Performance Indicia   
 It is difficult to measure the effects of the changes in wholesale market structure 
and institutions on wholesale market prices in the Northeast and Midwest since the mid-
1990s when the reforms began.  The wholesale markets that existed in 1996 were 
essentially “excess capacity” markets involving trades of electric energy between 
vertically integrated utilities who relied on regulated tariffs and captive retail customers 
to secure the capital costs for these facilities.  Moreover, fuel prices, especially natural 
gas prices, have escalated dramatically since 1996 and hundreds of thousands of 
megawatts of unregulated generating capacity must cover both their capital and operating 
costs through the sales of energy, ancillary services and capacity in competitive 
wholesale markets.  Congestion costs are now transparent and revealed by differences in 
locational prices while they were once hidden in redispatch and unit commitment costs.  
There are some fragments of evidence about changes in wholesale market prices to 
consider, however.   
A study comparing what prices would have emerged under cost of service 
regulation with the cost of buying that power in PJM’s wholesale markets for three 
utilities in PJM, taking input cost changes into account, found that the cost of power 
purchased in PJM’s wholesale market was lower than what the cost of that power would 
have been under continued cost of service regulation (Synapse Energy Economics 
(2004)).  Wholesale market prices in New England, adjusted for changes in fuel prices, 
fell between 2000 and 2004 (See Table 4). Moreover, despite the fact that nominal 
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wholesale market prices in the Northeast have risen along with fuel prices, the “all in” 
cost of power in the wholesale market (energy, ancillary services and capacity costs) is 
lower than the inflation adjusted regulated cost of generation service that was embedded 
to the regulated retail prices for many of the utilities in the Northeastern states in the late 
1990s.  For example, in the late 1990s, many northeastern utilities had average regulated 
costs of generation service in the 6 cent to 8 cent/kWh range (Joskow (2000)) or about 7 
to 9.5 cents/kWh at current general price levels (without taking account of fuel price 
increases specifically).  For the period 2002-2004, the all-in cost of power in the 
wholesale market in New York State outside of New York City and Long Island averaged 
about $50/Mwh.   For New England the “all-in” price of wholesale power was about 
$50/Mwh over the period 2001-2004.  In both cases this is significantly lower than the 
regulated cost of generation service embedded in retail prices prior to these reforms for 
many utilities in this region. 
We should recognize, however, that cost-of-service regulation provided 
consumers with a hedge against fluctuations in fuel prices.  In competitive markets the 
spot market price of electricity will reflect the marginal cost of the supplier that clears the 
market or the (much higher) value of unserved energy (or cost of lost load) when the 
market is cleared on the demand side under “scarcity conditions” when capacity is fully 
utilized  Accordingly, if the marginal generating capacity that clears the market is 
natural-gas fired, the all-in market price of wholesale electricity will vary with variations 
in the price of natural gas, other things equal.  Under cost-of-service regulation the all-in 
cost of generation service would be less sensitive to movements in natural gas prices in 
this case since the regulated costs of hydro, nuclear and coal-fired capacity would not 
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vary directly with natural gas prices.  Under cost-of-service regulation, natural gas price 
increases would have been reflected in retail prices in proportion to the fraction of 
generation accounted for by gas-fired capacity under cost-of-service regulation.  
Deregulation removes this hedge, making wholesale prices more sensitive to variations in 
the prices for fuel used by the marginal generating capacity that clears the market.  If 
natural gas prices stay very high, it may turn out to be the case that in the short run, the 
costs of purchasing generation supplies out of competitive wholesale market will be 
higher than the costs consumers would have paid under regulation as the rents associated 
with unregulated hydro, nuclear and coal capacity will now accrue to the owners of this 
capacity rather than to consumers as a consequence of the loss of this regulatory hedge.  
On the other hand, under regulation when there was excess capacity, prices rose to allow 
recovery of fixed costs while with competition excess capacity should lead to lower 
prices, other things equal.  Consumers also were asked to pay for large generating plant 
construction cost overruns under regulation, while with competition it’s the investors that 
bear construction cost overrun risks.   We have too little experience to know how much 
these countervailing forces will affect generation service prices in the long run.        
One of the benefits expected from the introduction of competitive wholesale 
markets was that it would provide incentives to improve the performance of the existing 
fleet of generating plants --- availability, non-fuel operating costs, heat rates (Joskow 
(1997)).  Availability of generating capacity has increased over time in both New 
England and New York (ISO New England (2005), page 114; New York ISO (2005), p. 
18).  Equivalent availability factors increased significantly in PJM from 1994 to 1998 and 
have been roughly constant since then with some year-to-year variability (PJM (2005), 
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p.168).  Markiewicz, Rose and Wolfram (2004) find that the operating costs of generating 
plants fell more in states in the process of restructuring to support competition than in 
states which were not in the process of adopting restructuring programs.   Bushnell and 
Wolfram (2005) find that divested generating plants and those subject to incentive 
regulation mechanisms improved their fuel efficiencies compared to their peers without 
high-powered incentives.  Though the evidence is still limited, it tends to support the 
conclusion that competition has provided incentives to increase generating unit 
performance. 
 
3.  IMPROVING WHOLESALE MARKET PERFORMANCE 
While there has certainly been a lot of progress made in creating good 
competitive wholesale market institutions, and there has been a lot of valuable learning 
from experience, there is still a lot more work to do.  The necessary reforms go well 
beyond modifications in the details of Orders 888/889 as some have suggested is the 
appropriate focus of future FERC policy initiatives.  Let me identify and discuss very 
briefly four areas where I think significant performance improvements need to be made. 
3.1  Incentives to invest in new generating capacity 
 Despite the enormous quantity of new generating capacity that entered service 
between 2000 and 2004, and the existence of excess capacity in most regions of the 
country, policymakers are now very concerned about future shortages of generating 
capacity resulting from retirements and inadequate investment.  Many of the merchant 
generating companies that made these investments subsequently experienced serious 
financial problems and several went bankrupt.  The liberal financing arrangements 
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available to support these projects during the financial bubble years are no longer 
available and project financing for new generating plants is difficult to arrange unless 
there is a long term sales contract with a creditworthy buyer to support it. Rising natural 
gas prices have changed the economic attractiveness of the combined-cycle gas turbine 
technology that has dominated the fleet of new plants. The quantity of new generating 
capacity coming out of the construction pipeline is falling significantly (see Table 2). 
Very little investment in new merchant generating capacity is being committed at the 
present time, aside from wind and other renewables that can obtain favorable tax 
treatment and other financial and contractual incentives.  System operators in the 
Northeast and California are projecting shortages and increases in power supply 
emergencies three to five years into the future, recognizing that developing, permitting 
and completing new generating plants takes several years.  Unlike the situation in 
England and Wales, the U.S. does not have large amounts of mothballed capacity that can 
come back into service quickly as prices rise. 
On the one hand, a market response that leads prices (adjusted for fuel costs) and 
profits to fall and investment to decline dramatically when there is excess capacity, is just 
the response that we would be looking for from a competitive market.  For 25 years prior 
to the most recent market reforms the regulated U.S. electric power industry had excess 
generating capacity which consumers were forced to pay for through regulated prices.  
The promise of competition was that investors would bear the risk of excess capacity and 
reap the rewards of tight capacity contingencies, a risk that they could try to reallocate by 
offering forward contracts to consumers and their intermediaries.  At least some of the 
noise about investment incentives is coming from owners of merchant generating plants 
 22
who would just like to see higher prices and profits.  On the other hand, numerous 
analyses of the performance of organized energy-only wholesale markets indicate that 
they do not appear to produce enough net revenues to support investment in new 
generating capacity in the right places and consistent with the administrative reliability 
criteria that are still applicable in each region.  Moreover, while capacity obligations and 
associated capacity prices that are components of the market designs in the Northeast 
produce additional net revenue for generators over and above what they get from selling 
energy and ancillary services, the existing capacity pricing mechanisms do not appear to 
yield revenues that fill the “net revenue” gap.  That is, wholesale prices have been too 
low even when supplies are tight. 
 The experience in PJM is fairly typical.  Table 5 displays the net revenue that a 
hypothetical new combustion turbine would have earned from the energy market plus 
ancillary services revenues in PJM if it were dispatched optimally to reflect its marginal 
running costs in each year 1999-2004.  In no year would a new peaking turbine have 
earned enough net revenues from sales of energy and ancillary services to cover the fixed 
costs of a new generating unit and, on average, the scarcity rents contributed only about 
40% of the costs of a new peaking unit.  Based on energy market revenues alone, it 
would not be rational for an investor to investment in new combustion turbine or CCGT 
capacity in PJM.  PJM has always had capacity obligations which it carried over into its 
competitive market design and in theory capacity prices should adjust to clear the market 
(Joskow and Tirole (2005b)).  However, even adding in capacity revenues, the total net 
revenues that would have been earned by a new plant over this six year period would 
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have been significantly less than the fixed costs that investors would need to expect to 
recover to make investment in new generating capacity profitable.   
This phenomenon is not unique to PJM.  Every organized market in the U.S. 
exhibits a similar gap between net revenues produced by energy markets and the fixed 
costs of investing in new capacity measured over several years time (FERC (2005), p. 60; 
New York ISO (2005), pages 22-25).  There is still a significant gap when capacity 
payments are included.  The only exception appears to be New York City where prices 
for energy and capacity collectively appear to be sufficient to support new investment, 
though new investment in New York may be much more costly than assumed in these 
analyses (FERC (2005), page 60).  Moreover, a large fraction of the net revenue there 
comes from capacity payments rather than energy market revenues (New York ISO 
(2005), p. 23). 
 I have discussed elsewhere some of the regulatory, system operation and market 
imperfections that seem systematically to lead organized wholesale energy markets to 
produce inadequate incentives for new investment in generation consistent with 
prevailing engineering reliability criteria (Joskow (2005a), Joskow and Tirole (2005b)).  
The problems include: (a) price caps on energy supplied to the market and related market 
power mitigation mechanisms that do not allow prices to rise high enough during  
conditions when generating capacity is fully utilized to provide energy and operating 
reserves to meet reliability constraints.  Under these conditions supply and demand 
should be balanced by responses on the demand side to high prices that reflect the value 
of lost load, producing significant competitive scarcity rents for generators; (b) price caps 
on capacity payments in the market designs that incorporate capacity obligations and 
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capacity prices; (c) actions by system operators that have the effect of keeping prices 
from rising fast enough and high enough to reflect the value of lost load during operating 
reserve emergencies when small changes in system operating procedures can lead to very 
large changes in prices and scarcity rents needed to cover fixed costs; (d) reliability 
actions taken by system operators that rely on Out of  Market (OOM) calls on generators 
that pay some generators premium prices but depress the market prices paid to other 
suppliers; (e) the absence of adequate spot market demand response to allow prices to 
play a larger role in balancing supply and demand under tight supply conditions; (f) 
payments to keep inefficient generators in service due to transmission and related 
constraints rather than allowing to be retired or be mothballed, (g) regulated generators 
operating within a competitive market that have poor incentives to make efficient 
retirement decisions, depressing market prices for energy and (h) engineering reliability 
rules that have not been harmonized with market mechanisms and may implicitly impose 
costs of meeting reliability standards that are significantly greater than consumers would 
be willing to pay in a well functioning competitive market. 
  This “resource adequacy” problems arising from imperfections in spot energy 
markets are now widely recognized by policymakers.  FERC’s proposed SMD rules 
contained requirements that system operators implement mechanisms to assure resource 
adequacy. Efforts are being made to reform capacity obligations and associated market 
mechanisms to try to deal with them (Cramton and Stoft (2005)).  More could be done to 
reform spot energy markets to allow prices to rise to appropriate competitive levels when 
generating capacity is fully utilized, to expand demand side participation in the spot 
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market, and to better harmonize reliability rules and reliability actions taken by system 
operators with market mechanisms.   
3.2 Improve the framework for supporting transmission investment and expanding 
effective transmission capacity 
 
 As wholesale markets have developed congestion on the transmission network 
has increased (Joskow (2005b, 2005c)) significantly.  Investment in transmission capacity 
has not kept pace with the expansion in generating capacity and changes in trading 
patterns (Hirst 2004).  Transmission congestion and related reliability constraints create 
load pockets, reducing effective competition among generators and leading policymakers 
to impose imperfect market power mitigation rules that create other distortions.   
In addition to the effects of transmission congestion on wholesale power prices 
and the social costs of congestion, a congested transmission network makes it more 
challenging to achieve efficient wholesale market performance.  Congestion increases 
market power problems and the use of highly imperfect regulatory mitigation 
mechanisms to respond to them. Congestion makes it more challenging for system 
operators to maintain reliability using standard market mechanisms, leading them to pay 
specific generators significant sums to stay in the market rather than retire and to rely 
more on OOM calls that depress market prices received by other suppliers (FERC (2005), 
pp. 6, 23, 61).  In New England, the amount of generating capacity operating subject to 
reliability contracts with the ISO has increased from about 500 Mw in 2002 to over 7,000 
Mw projected (including pending contracts) for 2005 (ISO-New England (2005), p.80).6 
These responses to transmission congestion undermine the performance of competitive 
                                                 
6 FERC has ordered the ISO to replace these agreements with a locational capacity market mechanism built 
around an administratively determined “demand curve” for generating capacity.  However, implementation 
has now been delayed until at least October 2006. 
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markets for energy, exacerbate the net revenue problem discussed above, and lead to 
additional costly administrative actions to respond to market imperfections resulting from 
transmission congestion. 
 The existing framework for supporting transmission investment is seriously 
flawed.  Regulatory responsibilities are split between the states and the federal 
government in sometimes mysterious ways (Joskow (2005b)).  FERC initially supported 
a flawed “merchant investment” model (Joskow and Tirole (2005a)) and confused issues 
of who pays for transmission upgrades with questions about whether such upgrades are 
mediated through market mechanisms (e.g. in return for FTRs) or regulatory mechanisms 
or a combination of both.   Transmission investments driven by reliability considerations 
and transmission investments driven by congestion cost reductions are inherently 
interdependent but have been treated by FERC and some system operators as if they were 
completely separable (Joskow (2005c)).  The U.S. does not even collect statistics on 
transmission investment and transmission network performance that are adequate to 
evaluate the performance of the network (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(2004)).  Despite promoting performance based regulation for transmission in Order 
2000, there has been little progress in developing and applying a coherent incentive 
regulation framework in practice.  Much of the increase in transmission investment that is 
reported to have occurred is associated with interconnections of new generators and 
associated network reinforcements to meet reliability criteria.  There has been little if any 
investment in transmission facilities to increase interregional transfer capability.   
While the situation is improving with the adoption of more comprehensive 
transmission planning and investment processes in New England, PJM and the MISO, the 
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transmission investment and regulatory framework has a long way to go before is will 
stimulate needed investments, to improve network performance and to create a 
transmission network platform that supports efficient competitive markets for power with 
less regulation and fewer administratively determined reliability contracts. 
3.3 Continue to reduce “seams” problems that create barriers to trade between 
market areas.  
 
The wholesale markets operating on the three synchronized U.S. transmission 
networks (Eastern Interconnection, Western Interconnection, and ERCOT (Texas)) are 
regional markets whose effective geographic expanses have grown over time.  However, 
there remain opportunities to further reduce barriers to trade and to expand their 
geographic scope. The differences in market prices observed for wholesale between 
different areas in the Northeast and Midwest (Figure 2) are partially a consequence of 
transmission network congestion.  However, the price differences are also caused by 
regulated transmission prices that create an inefficient wedge between energy prices in 
different areas.  They also reflect incompatibilities in the wholesale market mechanisms 
in different ISOs that limit trading in the spot markets operated in each area.  Long 
distance trades in energy can still incur multiple transmission charges that include 
“pancaked” sunk cost allocations and make efficient trades uneconomical.  Differences in 
the timing of the bidding and market clearing mechanisms and asymmetric treatment of 
generators in different control areas can further inhibit short-term trading opportunities 
and lead to inefficient allocation of scarce transmission capacity.  The efforts by New 
England and New York and by PJM and the MISO to reduce these trading barriers are 
admirable and these efforts should be expanded to other regions.   
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3.4  Increase demand response 
  In markets for most goods and services when demand grows and supply capacity 
constraints are reached prices rise to ration demand to match the capacity available to 
provide supplies to the market.  In electricity markets, however, as generating capacity 
constraints are reached, relatively little demand can be rationing by short term price 
movements and, instead, must by rationed with rolling blackouts.  The possibility of 
broader uncontrolled cascading blackouts and regional network collapses further 
exacerbates this problem, necessarily leads to regulatory requirements specifying 
operating reserves, operating reserve deficiency criteria and associated administrative 
actions by system operators to balance the system to meet voltage, stability and frequency 
requirements in an effort to avoid cascading blackouts (Joskow and Tirole (2005b)).  The 
challenges faced by network operators to maintain system reliability and avoid non-price 
rationing of demand would be reduced if additional demand-side instruments were at its 
disposal.  These include more customers who can see and respond to rapid changes in 
market prices and expanded use of price-contingent priority rationing contracts (Chao 
and Wilson 1987).  
 Too little demand side response has been developed to date.  In New England, 
with a peak demand of over 26,000 Mw only a few hundred Mw is available to the 
system operator for use during power supply emergencies (ISO New England (2005), 
p.91).  New York, with a peak demand of over 30,000 Mw has done better with about 
1700 Mw of “quick” demand response (New York ISO (2005)).  The demand response 
instruments that are available are poorly integrated with spot markets and are likely to 
have the effect of depressing prices inefficiently.  Moreover, the prices that are paid for 
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demand response or the prices that can be avoided by responding to price signals are too 
low compared to the cost of carrying generating capacity reserves to meet planning 
reserve margins.  Improving demand response should be given higher priority in 
wholesale market design.   
 
4.  RETAIL COMPETITION 
 
 In the policy arena, the primary selling point for competition in electricity in most 
states has been the prospect for retail competition or retail customer choice to lead to 
lower retail electricity prices.   My assessment of the status of retail competition among 
the states is displayed in Figure 3.  All of the states, except for Texas, that have 
implemented and sustained comprehensive retail competition programs are in the 
Northeast and upper Midwest.  These states had regulated retail prices that were among 
the highest in the U.S. in 1996 (Joskow (2000)). California suspended its retail 
competition program in 2001 as did Arizona (where it never really got started).  Three 
states have programs that are limited to selected industrial customers.  All of the other 
states either withdrew their existing plans to introduce retail competition after the 
California electricity crisis or never adopted a retail competition plan.  There appears to 
be little interest today in those states without retail competition to introduce it and some 
pressure in states that have it to repeal it.  
With a retail competition program, an electricity customer’s bill is “unbundled” 
into regulated non-bypassable “delivery” component with a price PR (transmission, 
distribution, stranded cost recovery, retail service costs to support default services) and a 
competitive component with a price PC (generation service, some retail service costs, and 
perhaps an additional “margin” to induce customers to shop).  The customer continues to 
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buy the regulated delivery component from the local distribution company but is free to 
purchase the competitive component from competing retailers which I will refer to as 
retail Electricity Service Providers (ESP).   
In most jurisdictions that have introduced retail competition programs, the 
incumbent distribution company is required to continue to provide regulated “default 
service” of some kind to retail consumers who do not choose an ESP during a transition 
period of from five to ten years.  The terms and conditions of default service vary across 
the states, but typically default service prices have been calculated in the following way.  
Regulators start with the incumbent’s prevailing regulated cost of generation service.  A 
fraction of this regulated generation cost component may be determined to be “stranded 
generation costs” that can be recovered from retail consumers over some time period and 
is included in the regulated price of delivery services PR.  The residual is then used to 
define the initial “default service” price PC or the “price to beat” by ESPs seeking to 
attract customers from the regulated default service tariffs available from the incumbent 
utility. The value of PC is then typically fixed for several years (sometimes with 
adjustments for fuel prices).  After the transition period the default price is expected to 
equal at least the competitive market value of providing competitive retail services to 
consumers. 
In many states the regulated default service price was either set or eventually fell 
below the comparable cost of power in the wholesale market.  In some cases, rising 
wholesale prices caused by higher gas prices erased or reversed the gap between the 
default price and the wholesale price.  For example, in Pennsylvania PPL has a default 
price of 5.5 cents/Kwh for residential customers that is based on a formula defined when 
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retail competition was initiated in Pennsylvania in 2000.7  The forward wholesale price 
for power delivered at PJM West for Calendar year 2006 (16 hours per day for six days 
per week) was about 8 cents/kWh on August 23, 2005.  PPL’s default price is not 
scheduled to rise to market levels until 2010.  Obviously, ESPs will find it difficult 
profitably to buy power at 8 cents and sell it at under 5.5 cents to attract customers away 
from default service. 
4.1 Customer Switching Patterns 
Most states that have introduced retail competition have experienced fairly similar 
and generally disappointing switching patterns.  Relatively few residential and small 
commercial customers switch to ESPs and the migration from the incumbent’s default 
service to competitive service for all but the largest customers is very slow (Joskow 
2005a).  Larger industrial customers are more likely to switch to ESPs and to do so much 
more quickly than residential customers.  
To provide a typical example, Table 6 displays the retail switching statistics for 
Massachusetts, one of the first states to introduce retail competition, for February 2004 
and May 2005.  Retail competition was introduced for all customers in Massachusetts in 
early 1998, so consumers have had seven years to adapt to it.  Only about 7% of the 
residential customers accounting for 6% of residential consumption have switched.  
There are few ESPs offering service to residential and small commercial customers active 
in the market.  Over a similar period of time, over 50% of the residential customers 
switched to competing suppliers in England and Wales and there are several competing 
retail suppliers offering service to residential (domestic) customers there.  Switching in 
Massachusetts has been greater among small, medium and large commercial customers, 
                                                 
7 Megawatt Daily, August 18, 2005, pages 1 and 10. 
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with the largest electricity consumers in each category being more likely to switch.  After 
seven years of retail competition, only 8% of the total retail customers accounting for 
34% of electricity consumption have switched to competitive suppliers.  However, 
switching among all classes of customers (and the number of ESPs seeking customers) 
now seems to be increasing since the regulated default service (called standard offer 
service in Massachusetts) ended in March 2005 and all default service prices began to 
reflect wholesale market values.  This appears to be the reason that we see a big jump in 
switching activity between February 2004 and May 2005. 
Texas has had the most successful U.S. retail competition program as measured 
by customer switching activity.  Retail competition began officially in Texas in January 
2002, though there was a pilot program implemented before that and customers who had 
switched before the official program began could stay with the ESPs they had chosen. 
Texas adopted a retail competition program similar to that in the UK.  Regulated default 
service was limited to smaller residential and commercial customers, the price for this 
service was set at (or above) wholesale market levels, the “price to beat” left an 
additional margin for competitive suppliers, and incumbents were given incentives to 
shift their retail customers to competitive suppliers. By June 2005 about 15% of the 
residential customers had switched to ESPs and the fraction continues to grow (Public 
Utility Commission of Texas (2005)).  For commercial customers, 20% of the customers 
and 46% of the load had switched to ESPs by June 2005, while 38% of the largest 
customers, accounting for 63% of the load, had switched to an ESP. Virtually all of the 
largest customers have negotiated competitive contracts either with the retailing affiliate 
of their incumbent utility or an unaffiliated ESP.  Unlike Pennsylvania, where the fraction 
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of customers served by ESPS has declined over time (not the sign of a successful 
product), retail switching shows a monotonic increasing trend in Texas.  Texas is also the 
state that has the largest number of active ESPs competing to sell service to retail 
consumers.   
The biggest problem facing ESPs is “competition” from regulated default service 
and the unpriced option to go and return from regulated to competitive retail prices and 
back again that is often embedded in it.  If regulated default service prices are set below 
the comparable wholesale market price of power, ESPs will not be able to compete for 
retail customers.  Moreover, allowing customers that choose to take service from an ESP 
to return to a regulated tariff when wholesale prices are high, without being charged an 
appropriate price for this option, seriously undermines the development of retail 
competition. This leads to a very unstable customer base for ESPs, and undermines 
incentives for ESPs  to enter into long term forward contracts or acquire generating assets 
to support their retail supply portfolios.  While I remain unconvinced that residential and 
small commercial consumers are likely to benefit from retail competition, compared to 
simply relying on the local distribution company to buy power for them in the wholesale 
market, the worst of all worlds is the adoption of policies that rely on retail competition 
evolving but make it uneconomical for customers to switch to an ESP.  Policymakers 
need to choose whether or not they really have faith in retail competition and adopt 
policies that either support its development if they do or rely instead on a wholesale 
competition model in which distribution companies procure power competitively if they 
don’t. 
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5.  RETAIL PRICE PATTERNS 
The promise of lower prices was the political selling point for competition in most 
states. Policymakers in many states are asking whether or not competition is benefiting 
consumers through lower prices.  We should be able to answer their questions.  But lower 
compared to what?  Lower than they were in 1996?  Lower than they would have been if 
the regulated monopoly regime had continued?  Lower in real dollars or nominal dollars? 
Policymakers were not particularly clear about the relevant comparisons as they were 
selling or opposing pro-competition reforms over the last decade. Given changes in fuel 
prices, demand, technology and environmental constraints, the only sensible comparison 
is between what prices are at a point in time under a competitive institutional framework 
and what they would have been if the prevailing regulated monopoly framework had 
continued.  Unfortunately, this is a difficult counterfactual comparison to make.  It is 
complicated by the large increase in natural gas prices (Figure 4) and the entry of almost 
200,000 Mw of new mostly gas fired generation since 1998 (Table 2).  Under a 
competitive model retail prices reflect the aggregation of competitive components 
(generation and retail supply) and regulated components (transmission and distribution). 
Moreover, since the industry structure and regulatory frameworks have varied from state 
to state, the answer to this question could very depend on variations in the nature of 
regulatory institutions and the performance of regulated firms in different states. 
 To place the analysis that follows in context, Figure 5 displays a time series of 
average real residential and industrial electricity prices from 1960 through 2004 for the 
U.S. as a whole.  Average real U.S. electricity prices fell virtually continuously from the 
early 20th century until about 1972.  The combination of rising inflation, rising nominal 
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interest rates, the exhaustion of scale economies in generation, and large increases in fuel 
prices in connection to the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 reversed this historical trend.  As 
fuel prices, inflation and nominal interest rates began to fall in the early 1980s, real 
electricity prices began to fall as well (Joskow (1974, 1989)).  While some trace the start 
of policy initiatives to promote competition to the implementation of PURPA in the early 
1980s, it is widely believed that PURPA, as it was implemented in the states with the 
greatest enthusiasm for it, led to higher rather than lower retail prices (Joskow (1989)).  
Accordingly, it would be incorrect to conclude from Figure 5 that there is a causal 
relationship between the implementation of PURPA and the renewed trend of lower real 
electricity prices.  The major contemporary competitive initiatives began to be realized 
after 1996 with Orders 888 and 889, the retail and wholesale restructuring initiatives in 
California and several Northeastern states in 1998, the associated divestiture of regulated 
generating plants that became unregulated Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWG) as 
permitted by reforms contained in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the entry of a large 
amount of new EWG capacity in many areas of the country following the state and 
federal reforms after 1996, and the subsequent FERC and state reforms that I have 
already discussed.  There is certainly no noticeable dramatic change in the trend of 
average real U.S. electricity prices displayed in Figure 5 that can be readily associated 
with these post-1996 reforms.  If anything, the rate at which real electricity prices fell 
seems to have declined as these reforms were implemented.  Accordingly, the aggregate 
time series data alone tell us little about the effects of competition and regulatory reforms 
on the prices paid by consumers. 
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   We can slice the data another way and compare the trends in retail prices in 
states that adopted retail competition reforms, often along with other restructuring 
reforms that supported the development of competitive wholesale markets, with the price 
trends in states that did not adopt such reforms.  Figure 6 compares the changes in real 
residential electricity prices for states that introduced retail competition and those that did 
not between 1996 and 2004.8  It is evident that real residential prices fell more in states 
that implemented retail competition programs than in those that did not. Only Texas 
shows an increase in residential prices. However, in light of the discussion in the last 
section, if the lower prices in retail competition states are due to competition reforms they 
are a consequence of the negotiations over stranded cost recovery, regulated default 
service pricing, lower wholesale market and perhaps reforms in the regulation of 
distribution networks rather than retail competition per se.  This must be the case because 
so few residential customers have switched from regulated default service to service 
provided by competitive retail suppliers.  Indeed, the states with the largest reductions in 
real prices (Illinois and New Jersey) had almost no residential switching.   Moreover, 
Texas has had the greatest success with getting residential customers to switch to 
competitive suppliers and is the only retail competition state to exhibit a significant 
increase in real residential prices during this period of time.   
Figure 7 displays the same information for industrial prices.  Here the results are 
more mixed.  There is no consistent pattern in the trends in real industrial prices for states 
                                                 
8 One important caveat to this and the analysis that follows should be noted.  The retail price data may have 
imperfections.  Reported retail price data ultimately rely on reports filed with the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA).  It is fairly clear that it took some time for EIA to take full and appropriate account 
of the impacts of retail competition on the price data reported to them.  However, by 2004 EIA seems to 
have solved these reporting problems so that the comparisons between 1996 prices before there was any 
retail competition and 2004 prices should be valid. 
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that implemented retail competition compared to those that did not.  Indeed, real 
industrial prices fell more on average in states without retail competition than in those 
states that introduced it for industrial customers.  States like Nevada and Montana 
introduced retail competition for industrial customers in a way that provided little 
protection from changes in wholesale market conditions, while other states provided 
hedged default service prices of varying durations and with varying terms and conditions.  
Moreover, the generation mix and the associated effects of fuel prices on generation 
costs, entry of unregulated generators, and changes in wholesale market conditions varies 
from region to region. 
   We can begin to analyze the impacts of wholesale and retail market reforms on 
electricity prices in different states using additional time series and cross-sectional data 
that measure these variables and allow us to control for various cost drivers. The 
following analysis is what I believe is the first, admittedly crude, empirical analysis to 
examine more systematically the effects of cost drivers and competitive policy reforms 
on retail prices across states and over time.  I view it as more of a systematic data 
analysis exercise than an effort to estimate a complete model of retail prices.  It is a 
starting point that I hope will lead to more refined analyses. 
 I have collected a state-level panel data set covering the period 1970 through 
20039 that includes variables measuring residential and industrial retail prices, various 
cost drivers, and variables measuring the intensity of various “deregulatory” initiatives, 
starting with PURPA. The data are discussed in more detail in the Appendix.  In the spirit 
of Stigler and Freidland (1962), I estimate the following price equation for residential and 
commercial customers using state-level data for the periods 1970 – 2003 and 1981-2003 
                                                 
9 The data for some of the right hand side variables are not yet available for 2004.  .   
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that include variables measuring cost drivers and those measuring the results of policy 
initiatives.  The sample begins well before the introduction of the policy treatments so 
that the coefficients of the cost drivers should be well established. 
Pitj =  β0 + β1RFCit + β2HYDROit + β3NUCLEARit + β4RYieldt + β5SIZEit        (1)  
 + β6PURPAitg + β7EWGit +β8RETAILit + µi + νt + εit 
where: 
 
i indexes states 
t indexes years 
j is either the residential price (r) or the industrial price (i)   
µi is a state specific error 
νt is a time specific error 
εit is an iid random error  
 
and the variables are defined as: 
 
P:   average retail residential or industrial price. 
 
RFC:  average real fossil fuel price per kWh of total electricity 
supplied in each state over time. 
 
RYield:  Real yield on electric utility debt over time. 
 
HYDRO: share of total electricity supplied coming from hydroelectric 
  generation in each state over time. 
 
NUCLEAR: share of total electricity generation coming from nuclear plants 
 in each state over time. 
 
PURPA:        share of total electricity generation coming from PURPA 
qualifying  facilities (QF) in each state beginning with 1985. 
 
EWG:   share of electricity generated by unregulated generators in each 
 state beginning in 1998. 
 
RETAIL: a dummy variable indicating whether or not a state had 
 Introduced retail competition in a particular year --- beginning 
 in 1998. 
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Table 7 presents the regression results for this price model for residential prices for the 
period 1970 through 2003 using (1) generalized least squares, (2) state-specific fixed 
effects  and (3) and state-specific fixed effects plus a time trend to correct for potential 
serial correlation.  Table 8 presents the results for the same specifications for a shorter 
panel covering the period 1981-2003.  Tables 9 and Table 10 present the same estimation 
results for industrial prices. 
 Let us look first at Tables 7 and 8 where the results for the residential price 
regressions are displayed.  The results for the three alternative specifications and the two 
time periods are quite similar.  For the residential price regressions the cost drivers 
generally behave as expected, recognizing that the fixed-effects regressions identify the 
coefficients from “within-state” variation over time.  Increases in real fuel prices lead to 
higher retail electricity prices.  More hydroelectric generation leads to lower retail prices.  
More nuclear capacity leads to higher retail prices reflecting the high capital costs of 
nuclear plants and their contribution to stranded cost recovery factors in states that 
introduced retail competition.  Higher real interest rates also are associated with higher 
residential prices. 
 Turning to the policy variables, the more important is PURPA (QF) generation 
the higher are retail prices, consistent with the earlier literature (Joskow (1989)).  The 
more important is unregulated wholesale market power supplies (EWG) the lower are 
retail prices.  EWG generation has potential effects in both states with retail competition 
and those without it since EWG generation is a substitute for the generation a vertically 
integrated utility might produce from its own power plants.  Note that there is substantial 
EWG generation in the Southeast where there is no retail competition.  Finally, the 
 40
coefficient on the retail competition dummy variable is consistently negative. The 
measured effect is that retail competition reduces retail prices on the order of 5% to 10% 
at the means of the sample.  
 Turning to Tables 9 and 10, the estimated relationships are generally similar for 
the industrial price equations as for the residential price equations.  However, the retail 
competition effect, on the order of a 5% reduction in prices, is numerically smaller at the 
means of the sample and is estimated less precisely than for the residential price 
equations. 
 These results are consistent with the view that PURPA was bad for consumers 
from a retail price perspective, but that wholesale competition, captured with the EWG 
variable, and retail competition have both been associated with lower retail prices once 
the major input cost drivers are controlled for.  These results must be interpreted with 
care, however.  There are several caveats.  First, the price data are likely to be imperfect.  
Reported retail price data ultimately rely on reports filed with the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA).  It is fairly clear that it took some time for EIA to take full and 
appropriate account of the impacts of retail competition on the price data reported to 
them.  To the extent that customers served by competitive retailers were excluded from 
the reports filed with EIA, the price data overestimate the actual prices realized by those 
customers who switched.  To the extent that utility reports include only the delivery 
charges for customers who have switched, average prices may be underestimated.  
Second, several of the right hand side variables are not exogenous (though they change 
slowly).  We know, for example, that retail competition was introduced in states with the 
highest retail prices and, other things equal, this would lead to an underestimate of the 
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effect of retail competition. The long time series and the use of state-specific fixed effects 
should help to mitigate these problems, but not necessarily fully.  Thus, further analysis 
to develop a more complete structural framework and relying on better data would be 
desirable. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The transition to competitive electricity markets has been a difficult process in the 
United States.  In 1997 I wrote “[E]lectricity restructuring … is likely to involve both 
costs and benefits.  If the restructuring is done right…the benefits … can significantly 
outweigh the costs.  But the jury is still out on whether policymakers have the will to 
implement the necessary reforms effectively” (Joskow (1997), p. 136).  I believe that 
statement continues to be true today. Creating competitive wholesale markets that 
function well is a significant technical challenge and requires significant changes in 
industry structure and supporting institutional and regulatory governance arrangements.  
It requires a commitment by policymakers to do what is necessary to make it work.  That 
commitment has been lacking in the U.S.  The major barrier to a successful restructuring 
and competition program in the U.S. at the present time is political.  Many of the 
technical problems associated with creating well functioning competitive electricity 
markets have been solved, often through bitter experience.  While FERC has been a 
leader in promoting competitive markets, the Bush administration and the Congress have 
provided tepid support at best.  Political compromises over restructuring, conflicts 
between federal and state regulations, the mixing of states with and without competition 
programs, the absence of a strong pro-competition policy and associated statutory 
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authorities coming from the Congress and advanced by the President have all worked to 
make successful reforms extremely difficult.   
 Despite these difficulties, considerable progress has been made and many useful 
lessons have been learned.  There is growing evidence that competition can lead to cost 
and price reductions if policymakers will support the regulatory and institutional changes 
needed to allow competitive market forces to work.  However, the creation of 
competitive market forces has also encountered some significant and costly problems and 
it is important that policies reflect the lessons learned from this experience.  My interim 
assessment is that the glass is half full rather than half empty at the present time.  I take 
this view based on the evidence of performance improvements and because the 
revisionist history about the “good old days of regulation” has conveniently ignored the 
$5000/Mw nuclear power plants, the 12 cent/kWh PURPA contracts, the wide variations 
across utilities in the construction costs and performance of their fossil plants, and the 
cross-subsidies buried in regulated tariffs that characterized the regulatory regimes in 
many states.  As we look at the costs and benefits of competition we should not forget the 
many costly problems that arose under regulation. 
 Looking at the maps in Figure 1 and Figure 3 it seems clear that about half of the 
country is focused on moving forward with pro-competition policies, at least at the 
wholesale level, and half is not.  Going forward I suspect that we will see a sort of contest 
between the performance of the regulated monopoly framework and the competitive 
market framework for governing the electric power sector in the U.S.  With continuing 
analysis of comparative performance of alternative institutional arrangements we will be 
able to determine more definitively what is the best that we can do in an imperfect world. 
TABLE 1 
 
INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATORS AND ORGANIZED WHOLESALE 
MARKETS 2005 
 
 
 
 
System Operator   Generating Capacity (MW) 
 
ISO-New England (RTO)     31,000 
 
New York ISO      37,000 
 
PJM (expanded) (RTO)   164,000 
 
Midwest ISO (MISO)    130,000 
 
California ISO       52,000 
 
ERCOT (Texas)      78,000 
 
Southwest Power Pool (RTO) 1    60,000 
 
ISO/RTO TOTAL    552,000 
 
 
TOTAL U.S. 
GENERATING CAPACITY   970,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Individual ISO web pages, trade press reports and U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIAa and EIAb), various issues.  
                                                 
1 Organized markets being developed. 
TABLE 2 
 
NEW U.S. GENERATING CAPACITY 
MW 
 
 
 
YEAR    CAPACITY ADDED (MW) 
 
1997       4,000 
 
1998       6,500 
 
1999     10,500 
 
2000     23,500 
 
2001     48,000 
 
2002     55,000 
 
2003     50,000 
 
2004     20,000 
 
2005 (through May)     2,000  
 
 
TOTAL    220,000 Mw 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIAa and EIAb), various issues. 
   
TABLE 3 
 
DAY-AHEAD NODAL PRICES IN NEW ENGLAND 
 July 19, 2005, Hour 17 
Load Zone Averages 
$/MWH 
 
 
Load Zone   Average Hour Price 
 
Maine    $130.56 
 
New Hampshire:   $159.34 
 
Vermont:   $195.65 
 
Massachusetts (NE):   $321.55 
 
Massachusetts (SE):  $162.12 
 
Massachusetts (WC):  $161.14 
 
Rhode Island:    $142.44 
 
Connecticut:   $165.96 
 
 
 
 
Source:  ISO New England Hourly Price Data Archive 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
 
AVERAGE REAL TIME ELECTRIC ENERGY PRICES IN NEW ENGLAND 
ADJUSTED FOR FUEL PRICE CHANGES 
$/MWH 
 
 
 
YEAR   ACTUAL  ADJUSTED FOR FUEL PRICES 
 
2000      $45.95   $45.95 
 
2001        48.60     43.03 
 
2002        46.55     37.52 
 
2003        53.40     43.51 
 
2004        54.44     43.33 
 
 
 
Source:  ISO-New England Annual Markets Report for 2004 (2005) 
TABLE 5 
 
THEORETICAL NET ENERGY AND ANCILLARY SERVICES REVENUE FOR A 
NEW COMBUSTION TURBINE PEAKING PLANT 
PJM 
$/MW-YEAR 
 
 
 
YEAR   Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue 
 
1999   $64,445 
 
2000     18,866 
 
2001     41,659 
 
2002     25,622 
 
2003     14,544 
 
2004     10,453 
 
 
AVERAGE  $ 29,265/MW-year 
 
 
Annualized 20-year Fixed Cost ~ $70,000/Mw/year 
 
 
Source: PJM State of the Market Report for 2004 (2005). 
TABLE 6 
 
RETAIL COMPETITION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
February 2004 and May 2005 
 
 
Retail Choice Began March 1998 
 
 
 
Customer Type   % of Load Served by ESPs 
 
     February 2004  May 2005 
Residential       2.6%     6.1% 
 
Small Commercial/Industrial   10.8%   19.3% 
 
Medium Commercial/Industrial  17.0%   22.2% 
 
Large Commercial/Industrial   48.3%   63.3% 
 
 
TOTAL      22.6%  34.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources, July 2005 
TABLE 7 
RESIDENTIAL PRICE EQUATIONS 
1970-2003 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
Variable    GLS   Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects plus time trend  
RFC       0.51     0.51    0.48 
     (0.019)   (0.019)    (0.019) 
 
HYDRO    -0.20   -0.16    -0.36 
     (0.077)   (0.095)    (0.099) 
 
NUCLEAR      0.39   0.38    0.45 
     (0.054)   (0.056)    (0.056) 
 
YIELD      0.042   0.043    0.47 
     (0.002)   (0.002)    (0.002) 
 
SIZE     -0.13   -0.13    -0.11 
     (0.0048)  (0.00048)   (0.0063) 
 
PURPA       0.43      0.42    0.61 
     (0.078)   (0.079)    (0.084) 
 
EWG     -0.24   -0.23    -0.23 
     (0.058)   (0.058)    (0.057) 
 
RETAIL    -0.24   -0.25    -0.21 
     (0.042)   (0.042)    (0.042) 
 
R2 (corrected)    0.74   0.61     0.62     
TABLE 8 
RESIDENTIAL PRICE EQUATIONS 
1981-2003 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
Variable    GLS   Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects plus time trend  
RFC       0.24     0.19    0.048 
     (0.031)   (0.032)    (0.029) 
 
HYDRO    -0.064   -0.125    -0.36 
     (0.11)   (0.153)    (0.137) 
 
NUCLEAR      0.21   0.136    0.082 
     (0.071)   (0.073)    (0.056) 
 
YIELD      0.06   0.06    0.027 
     (0.0046)  (0.0047)   (0.004) 
 
SIZE     -0.18   -0.21    -0.0001 
     (0.0077)  (0.0088)   (0.0089) 
 
PURPA       0.22      0.122   0.288 
     (0.09)   (0.092)    (0.082) 
 
EWG     -0.19   -0.16    -0.16 
     (0.054)   (0.054)    (0.048) 
 
RETAIL    -0.24   -0.25    -0.126 
     (0.039)   (0.038)    (0.034) 
 
R2 (corrected)    0.66   0.73     0.79     
TABLE 9 
INDUSTRIAL PRICE EQUATIONS 
1970-2003 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
Variable    GLS   Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects plus time trend  
RFC       0.74     0.73    0.68 
     (0.019)   (0.02)    (0.019) 
 
HYDRO    -0.264   -0.13    -0.535 
     (0.078)   (0.10)    (0.10) 
 
NUCLEAR      0.20     0.22    0.42 
     (0.071)   (0.055)    (0.056) 
 
YIELD      0.034   0.034    0.043 
     (0.0054)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
 
SIZE     -0.4   -0.4    -0.3 
     (0.034)   (0.04)    (0.03) 
 
PURPA      0.41      0.38      0.69 
     (0.08)   (0.081)    (0.083) 
 
EWG     -0.26   -0.24    -0.22 
     (0.059)   (0.059)    (0.057) 
 
RETAIL    -0.16   -0.17    -0.12 
     (0.043)   (0.043)    (0.042) 
 
R2 (corrected)    0.62   0.60     0.64     
TABLE 10 
INDUSTRIAL PRICE EQUATIONS 
1981-2003 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
Variable    GLS   Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects plus time trend  
RFC       0.53     0.48    0.23 
     (0.03)   (0.031)    (0.026) 
 
HYDRO    -0.40   -0.29    -0.62 
     (0.10)   (0.15)    (0.12) 
 
NUCLEAR      0.11     0.056    0.029 
     (0.071)   (0.075)    (0.057) 
 
YIELD      0.078   0.079    0.029 
     (0.0045)  (0.004)    (0.004) 
 
SIZE     -0.4   -0.4    -0.3 
     (0.04)   (0.04)    (0.03) 
 
PURPA       0.24     0.10      0.18 
     (0.09)   (0.09)    (0.072) 
 
EWG     -0.24   -0.23    -0.15 
     (0.054)   (0.055)    (0.042) 
 
RETAIL    -0.18   -0.20    -0.043 
     (0.039)   (0.039)    (0.03) 
 
R2 (corrected)    0.61   0.68     0.82     
 
 
Figure 1:  ISOs and RTOs in the United States 2005 
 
 
Source: U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2005), p. 52 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Day-ahead Peak Period Prices (2004) $/MWH 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Megawatt Daily, The McGraw-Hill Companies, (various issues) 
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Figure 3:  Status of retail competition and restructuring reforms 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s assessments 
 
 
Figure 4:  Average natural gas wellhead prices 1991-2004, $/MCF 
 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIAc, EIAd) (various issues) 
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Figure 5:  Average real U.S. electricity prices 1960-2004 ($2000) 
 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIAd, EIAa) (various issues), nominal prices adjusted 
using the GDP deflator 
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Figure 6:  Changes in real residential prices with and without retail competition 
1996-2004 (%) 
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Source:  Calculated from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIAa, EIAb, EIAd) (various issues), 
adjusted for changes in the consumer price index. 
 
Figure 7:  Changes in real industrial prices 1996-2004 with and without retail 
competition (%) 
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Source:  Calculated from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIAa, EIAb,EIAd) (various issues), 
adjusted for changes in the Consumer Price Index. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
State-level data from 1970 through 2003 were used to estimate the regression coefficients 
for equation (1) as reported in Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10.  Maryland and the District of 
Columbia have been combined for all years due to the sources’ combined data 
presentation in several years.  Idaho was dropped due to data imperfections.  Data 
construction becomes challenging after 1997 as a result of divestiture of utility plants, 
entry of EWGs and spread of retail competition. EIAa, EIAb, EIAc are used extensively 
to fill gaps in EEIa and EEIb. 
 
Retail electricity prices:  Retail prices are measured as average revenue per kWh sold to 
residential and industrial customers respectively for  total electric power industry by 
state.  These data include municipal and cooperative distribution companies.  EEIa, EIAa, 
EIAb, EIA (2005). 
 
Average fuel cost (adjusted for changes in CPI with 1970 = 1): Average real fuel cost per 
kWh of electricity generated in each state, including by independent power producers 
after 1997. EEIa, EIAa, and EIA (2005). 
 
Hydro electric generation share:  Fraction of total electricity generated in each state 
accounted for by hydroelectric generating capacity.  EEIa and EIA (2005). 
 
Nuclear generation share:  Fraction of total electricity generated in each state accounted 
for by nuclear generating plants.  EEIa and EIA (2005). 
 
PURPA generation share:  Estimate of fraction of total electricity generated in each state 
accounted for by PURPA Qualified Facilities.  Series starts in 1986.  MWh of PURPA 
generation assumed constant after 1997.  EEIb and EIA (2005).   Overlap years are 
averaged. 
 
EWG generation share:  Eastimate of fraction of generation in each state accounted for by 
unregulated generators, excluding PURPA generators.  Series starts in 1998.  EIA (2005). 
 
Real bond yields:  Moody’s average yield on electric utility bonds minus the annual rate 
of inflation in consumer prices (CPI). 
 
Average residential and industrial kWh consumption per customer: Average consumption 
per retail customer for residential and industrial customers for the total electric power 
industry by state.  EEIa, EIAa, EIAb, EIA (2005). 
 
Retail competition:  Dummy variable = 1 if retail competition. Author’s assessments 
based on programs initiated in each state.  First retail competition program 1998.  
California is treated as having retail competition beginning in 1998. 
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